Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters
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Publication:1985738
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.005zbMath1433.91068OpenAlexW3003353436MaRDI QIDQ1985738
Publication date: 7 April 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.005
Related Items (3)
Stable preference aggregation with infinite population ⋮ Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency ⋮ Preference aggregation and atoms in measures
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