Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1986591
DOI10.1007/S00355-019-01218-1zbMath1436.91013OpenAlexW2767569567MaRDI QIDQ1986591
Publication date: 8 April 2020
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01218-1
History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Welfare economics (91B15)
Cites Work
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
- Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
- Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
- Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
- A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers
- On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Competition in Persuasion
- Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
- Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
This page was built for publication: Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
