On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
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Publication:1986593
DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01220-7zbMath1436.91062OpenAlexW2766869052MaRDI QIDQ1986593
Anup Pramanik, Abhinaba Lahiri
Publication date: 8 April 2020
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/67804
Related Items (4)
Geometry of anonymous binary social choices that are strategy-proof ⋮ Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference ⋮ Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice ⋮ A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
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- A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
- Voting by Committees
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