Majority rule on \(j\)-rich ballot spaces

DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01223-4zbMath1436.91063OpenAlexW2985785822WikidataQ126807834 ScholiaQ126807834MaRDI QIDQ1986597

Trevor Leach, Robert C. Powers

Publication date: 8 April 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01223-4

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulesocial choice function\(j\)-rich ballot space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations

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• Social Choice and Individual Ranking I
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