Upper set rules with binary ranges

DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01225-2zbMath1436.91061OpenAlexW2987074057MaRDI QIDQ1986598

Hirofumi Yamamura, Makoto Hagiwara

Publication date: 8 April 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01225-2

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicity conditionsocial choicestrategy-proofnessupper set rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
• Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
• On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
• Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Strategy-proof location of public facilities
• Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
• Voting by Committees
• Strategy-Proof Exchange

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