Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem

DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01226-1zbMath1436.91072OpenAlexW2988631875WikidataQ126747762 ScholiaQ126747762MaRDI QIDQ1986600

Kiyong Yun, Youngsub Chun

Publication date: 8 April 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01226-1

zbMATH Keywords

probabilistic assignmentstochastic dominance efficiencyupper-contour strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (6)

On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results ⋮ Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result ⋮ A new impossibility result for random assignments ⋮ Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem

Cites Work

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• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
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• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
• When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms

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