Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1986600
DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01226-1zbMath1436.91072OpenAlexW2988631875WikidataQ126747762 ScholiaQ126747762MaRDI QIDQ1986600
Publication date: 8 April 2020
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01226-1
Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (6)
On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results ⋮ Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result ⋮ A new impossibility result for random assignments ⋮ Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
Cites Work
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
- Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
- A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
This page was built for publication: Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
