Deductive cogency, understanding, and acceptance

DOI10.1007/S11229-017-1365-4zbMath1398.03018OpenAlexW2594407947MaRDI QIDQ1989991

Finnur Dellsén

Publication date: 29 October 2018

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://philarchive.org/rec/DELDCU

zbMATH Keywords

preface paradoxdeductive closurebelief versus acceptancedeductive consistencyepistemology of understanding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (1)

Rational understanding: toward a probabilistic epistemology of acceptability

Cites Work

• The lottery: A paradox regained and resolved
• Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief
• Knowing That P without Believing That P
• Elusive Knowledge
• Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis
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