Designing coalition-based fair and stable pricing mechanisms under private information on consumers' reservation prices

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2018.06.026zbMath1403.91174OpenAlexW2788267850WikidataQ129580323 ScholiaQ129580323MaRDI QIDQ1991130

Olivier Beaude, Bernardo K. Pagnoncelli, Hélène Le Cadre, Tito Homem-de-mello

Publication date: 30 October 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.06.026

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycoalition formationOR in energyload schedulingforecast algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

A game-theoretic analysis of transmission-distribution system operator coordination ⋮ Profit maximizing coalitions with shared capacities in distribution networks ⋮ Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: from variational to generalized Nash equilibrium

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