Sufficiency of an outside bank and a default penalty to support the value of fiat money: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2014.04.013zbMath1402.91458OpenAlexW3124757158MaRDI QIDQ1991929

Shyam Sunder, Martin Shubik, Juergen Huber

Publication date: 2 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d16/d1675-r.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumfiat moneybankexperimental gamingoutside bank

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Loanable funds versus money creation in banking: a benchmark result ⋮ On the money creation approach to banking

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Three minimal market institutions with human and algorithmic agents: theory and experimental evidence
• Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
• The inflationary bias of real uncertainty and the harmonic Fisher equation
• The optimal bankruptcy rule in a trading economy using fiat money
• Construction of Stationary Markov Equilibria in a Strategic Market Game
• Equilibrium with Transaction Costs

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