Learning a population distribution
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Publication:1991943
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2014.09.010zbMath1402.91081OpenAlexW2156450414MaRDI QIDQ1991943
Publication date: 2 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.09.010
Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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