Learning to bid in sequential Dutch auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.09.029zbMath1402.91171OpenAlexW2062123738MaRDI QIDQ1991962

Alan P. Kirman, Sonia Moulet, Eric Guerci

Publication date: 2 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.09.029

zbMATH Keywords

agent-based computational economicsmulti-agent learningauction markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time ⋮ An Auction Approach for Cost and Schedule Management of IT Outsourcing Project

Cites Work

• Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
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• INDIVIDUAL EXPECTATIONS AND AGGREGATE BEHAVIOR IN LEARNING-TO-FORECAST EXPERIMENTS

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