Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2013.06.016zbMath1402.91935OpenAlexW2043957692MaRDI QIDQ1994173

Janet Hua Jiang, Jasmina Arifovic, Yi-Ping Xu

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2013.06.016

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesevolutionary algorithmbank runsexperimental studies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Financial applications of other theories (91G80) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Stabilizing expectations at the zero lower bound: experimental evidence ⋮ Funding liquidity, debt tenor structure, and creditor's belief: an exogenous dynamic debt run model

Cites Work

• Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games
• The heterogeneous expectations hypothesis: Some evidence from the lab
• Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation
• Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
• Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
• Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study
• The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information

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