Evolution of repeated prisoner's dilemma play under logit dynamics

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2013.06.012zbMath1402.91054OpenAlexW2116293543MaRDI QIDQ1994177

Marius-Ionut Ochea

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cendef.uva.nl/binaries/content/assets/subsites/amsterdam-school-of-economics/amsterdam-school-of-economics-research-institute/cendef/working-papers-2012/ochea-evolutionipd-191212.pdf?1363339497911

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionrepeated gamesprisoner's dilemmaPavlov

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation

Uses Software

• E&F Chaos

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with logit dynamics
• Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability
• E\&F Chaos: A user friendly software package for nonlinear economic dynamics
• Endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in Cournot competition
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
• The logit-response dynamics
• When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation
• Building rational cooperation
• Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
• Elements of applied bifurcation theory

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