Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2013.01.003zbMath1402.91237OpenAlexW2111231900MaRDI QIDQ1994233

Shuyun May Li

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2013.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationlimited commitmentborrowing constraintsimpatient entrepreneuroptimal lending contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement
• The risk-free rate in heterogeneous-agent incomplete-insurance economies
• Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information
• Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
• Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

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