Best response dynamics with level-\(n\) expectations in two-stage games

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2014.01.019zbMath1402.91030OpenAlexW3123101787MaRDI QIDQ1994422

Dennis Heitmann, Herbert Dawid

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.01.019

zbMATH Keywords

best response dynamicsmulti-stage gamesexpectation formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items

Equilibrium selection of a homogenous duopoly with extrapolative foresight ⋮ Should sophisticated expectations facilitate reaching equilibrium behavior? ⋮ Does local monopolistic approximation imply a less stable equilibrium?

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