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Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard

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Publication:1994432
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DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2014.02.004zbMath1402.91542OpenAlexW2155653170MaRDI QIDQ1994432

Bo Sun

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2009/985/ifdp985.pdf


zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractcorporate governanceexecutive compensationearnings management


Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)


Related Items (2)

Managerial compensation under privately-observed hedging and earnings management ⋮ ASSET RETURNS UNDER PERIODIC REVELATIONS OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT



Cites Work

  • Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?*


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