Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1994622
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2014.06.007zbMath1402.91044OpenAlexW2166720633MaRDI QIDQ1994622
Fernando Vega-Redondo, Luis R. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. Izquierdo
Publication date: 1 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.06.007
Related Items (18)
Moderate tolerance promotes tag-mediated cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Game theory and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game ⋮ Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance ⋮ Labelling, homophily and preference evolution ⋮ Efficiency may improve when defectors exist ⋮ Cooperation, punishment and immigration ⋮ Social Hierarchy and the Evolution of Behavior ⋮ The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players ⋮ Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm ⋮ Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present ⋮ Matching markets and cultural selection ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Robustness against indirect invasions
- Voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma with reference letters
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
- Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
- Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
- The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
- In defense of DEFECT.
- Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution
- Supergames played by finite automata with finite costs of complexity in an evolutionary setting
- Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
- Active linking in evolutionary games
- Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching
- Methodology in Biological Game Theory
- Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation
- The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
- Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
- Stochastic evolution with slow learning
This page was built for publication: Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
