Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2014.06.007zbMath1402.91044OpenAlexW2166720633MaRDI QIDQ1994622

Fernando Vega-Redondo, Luis R. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. Izquierdo

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2014.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmaexit optionpositive assortmentconditional dissociationoption to leave

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (18)

Moderate tolerance promotes tag-mediated cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Game theory and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game ⋮ Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance ⋮ Labelling, homophily and preference evolution ⋮ Efficiency may improve when defectors exist ⋮ Cooperation, punishment and immigration ⋮ Social Hierarchy and the Evolution of Behavior ⋮ The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players ⋮ Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm ⋮ Asymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present ⋮ Matching markets and cultural selection ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option

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