Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?
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Publication:1994632
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2014.06.013zbMath1402.91204OpenAlexW2145120306MaRDI QIDQ1994632
Publication date: 1 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/809820/1/RiskinessJEDC.pdf
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Cites Work
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