Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
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Publication:1995288
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105128zbMath1455.91116arXiv2009.12114OpenAlexW3095968688MaRDI QIDQ1995288
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.12114
Related Items (4)
Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples ⋮ Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations ⋮ Bundling Decisions for Selling Multiple Items in Online Auctions
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