Information aggregation with runoff voting

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105130zbMath1460.91083OpenAlexW2972705635MaRDI QIDQ1995290

Dimitrios Xefteris, Nikolas Tsakas

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/09-19.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

electionsinformation aggregationrunoff votingCondorcet jury theoremsequential eliminationpartisan voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory

Cites Work

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• Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
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• One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• Voting as Communicating
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1

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