Multiple priors and comparative ignorance

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105132zbMath1458.91064OpenAlexW3097218375MaRDI QIDQ1995291

Igor Kopylov

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105132

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversionpreference reversalsintransitivitycomparative ignorancedecision avoidancepartition dependence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cites Work

• Justifiable preferences
• An axiomatic characterization of preferences under uncertainty: Weakening the independence axiom
• Non-transitive measurable utility for decision under uncertainty
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Regret theory: a new foundation
• Rational choice with status quo bias
• An axiomatic foundation for regret theory
• Small worlds: Modeling attitudes toward sources of uncertainty
• Framing Contingencies
• "Preference Reversal" and the Observability of Preferences by Experimental Methods
• Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance
• A Definition of Subjective Probability
• Comparative ignorance and the Ellsberg paradox

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