Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105133zbMath1460.91086OpenAlexW3094792461MaRDI QIDQ1995292

Siyang Xiong

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105133

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriasocial choicereferendumdictator

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
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• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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