Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
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Publication:1995295
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105144zbMath1458.91110arXiv1401.3675OpenAlexW3101852004MaRDI QIDQ1995295
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.3675
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (19)
Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms ⋮ Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited ⋮ Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results ⋮ The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information ⋮ Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment ⋮ A new impossibility result for random assignments ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain ⋮ Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem ⋮ Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem ⋮ Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
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