Information design in competitive insurance markets

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105160zbMath1460.91222OpenAlexW3101988914MaRDI QIDQ1995307

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105160

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectioninsurance marketsinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Informational Equilibrium
• On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
• The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance
• Matching to share risk
• Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection versus Reclassification Risk

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