The value of mediated communication
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Publication:1995329
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105191zbMath1458.91043OpenAlexW2732174589MaRDI QIDQ1995329
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105191
concavificationincentive compatibilityBayesian persuasioncommunication gamesvirtual utilityoptimal mediation
Related Items (5)
Goodwill in communication ⋮ Long information design ⋮ Communication with endogenous deception costs ⋮ Bayesian persuasion: reduced form approach ⋮ Resilient Information Aggregation
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