Trading votes for votes: a laboratory study

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.10.004zbMath1458.91075OpenAlexW3097413581MaRDI QIDQ1995456

Alessandra Casella, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/106434/

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsvotinglogrollingvote trading

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Uses Software

• ORSEE

Cites Work

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• The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
• The Farsighted Stable Set
• Rational expectations and farsighted stability
• Trading Votes for Votes. A Dynamic Theory

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