The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.002zbMath1458.91093OpenAlexW2767320434MaRDI QIDQ1995460

Bary S. R. Pradelski, Jacob D. Leshno

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

informationprice discoveryconvergence timeassignment game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Analysis of stochastic matching markets
• Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
• A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
• Stochastic stability in assignment problems
• Paths to stability in the assignment problem
• Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
• Estimating the dimension of a model
• Aspiration adaptation theory
• The auction algorithm: A distributed relaxation method for the assignment problem
• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
• A forward/reverse auction algorithm for asymmetric assignment problems
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• A competitive partnership formation process
• Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies
• Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
• Solutions for the stable roommates problem with payments
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Uncoordinated Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
• Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
• Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction
• Max-Product for Maximum Weight Matching: Convergence, Correctness, and LP Duality
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Theoretical Improvements in Algorithmic Efficiency for Network Flow Problems
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• Learning and Price Discovery in a Search Market
• Bayes Factors
• Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage