Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
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Publication:1995461
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006zbMath1458.91014OpenAlexW3108053261MaRDI QIDQ1995461
Thomas Mariotti, Gwenaël Piaser, Eloisa Campioni, Andrea Attar
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006
Related Items (4)
Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals ⋮ Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment ⋮ Private communication in competing mechanism games ⋮ General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
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