The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
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Publication:1995464
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.006zbMath1458.91030OpenAlexW3081265119MaRDI QIDQ1995464
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.006
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)
Related Items (4)
Computational complexity of computing a quasi-proper equilibrium ⋮ A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games ⋮ The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games ⋮ Risk-free bidding in complement-free combinatorial auctions
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Cites Work
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