Signaling valence in primary elections

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.008zbMath1458.91074OpenAlexW3011338849MaRDI QIDQ1995468

Giovanni Andreottola

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp559.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

signalingpolarizationvalencepolicy extremismprimary elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters ⋮ Ideological extremism and primaries

Cites Work

• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
• Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
• Ideological extremism and primaries
• Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions
• Competence and Ideology
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

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