Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.001zbMath1458.91058OpenAlexW3025980039MaRDI QIDQ1995472

Yves Sprumont, Eric Bahel

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessdecomposabilityparticipatory budgetingmonotonic additive preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
• Voting by committees under constraints
• Voting by Committees
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

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