Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.003zbMath1458.91102OpenAlexW3114837872MaRDI QIDQ1995474

Xuesong Huang

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

strategic market gamerational expectations equilibriumlarge economyincentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (1)

Incentive compatibility under ambiguity

Cites Work

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