Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
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Publication:1995476
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.004zbMath1458.91106OpenAlexW3113770744MaRDI QIDQ1995476
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.004
Group preferences (91B10) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Kidney Exchange
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
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