Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
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Publication:1995479
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.006zbMath1458.91104OpenAlexW2953434522MaRDI QIDQ1995479
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.11.006
Markov perfect equilibriumlaboratory experimentsveto powerdynamic legislative bargainingendogenous status quodistributive politicsstanding committees
Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (5)
Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model ⋮ The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power ⋮ Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic? ⋮ BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
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