The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.004zbMath1458.91031OpenAlexW3121910149MaRDI QIDQ1995482

Claudia Keser, Alexia Gaudeul, Stephan Müller

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2019s-29.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentevolutioncooperationindirect reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
• On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
• Evolution and Kantian morality
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
• The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
• Social norms and random matching games
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Observations on Cooperation
• Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

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