Bargaining with a residual claimant: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.005zbMath1458.91100OpenAlexW3123383200MaRDI QIDQ1995491

Kyle Hyndman, Matthew Embrey, Arno Riedl

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/b98f3188-6ee7-4990-b12c-8db2d2ae10d5

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingreference pointsex-post risk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Related Items (1)

On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

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• The Bargaining Problem
• The Allocation of Inventory Risk in a Supply Chain: Push, Pull, and Advance-Purchase Discount Contracts
• Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
• Risk and Rationality: Uncovering Heterogeneity in Probability Distortion
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Higher Order Risk Attitudes, Demographics, and Financial Decisions

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