Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.003zbMath1458.91032arXiv1701.04870OpenAlexW3126015425MaRDI QIDQ1995492

Luc Rey-Bellet, Sung-Ha Hwang

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.04870

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityNash bargaining solutionpositive feedbackevolutionary gamesexit problemslogit choice rulesmarginal bandwagon propertyNash demand games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under probit choice

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