Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.01.002zbMath1458.91120OpenAlexW3123493709MaRDI QIDQ1995493

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.002

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachmoral hazardlimited liabilitypay-for-performancerisk-neutral agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
• Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
• From Pigou to Extended Liability: On the Optimal Taxation of Externalities Under Imperfect Financial Markets
• Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt
• A general solution method for moral hazard problems

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