Perfect information games where each player acts only once
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Publication:1996105
DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3zbMath1458.91013OpenAlexW2560273061WikidataQ127802334 ScholiaQ127802334MaRDI QIDQ1996105
Kutay Cingiz, Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Janos Flesch
Publication date: 3 March 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01199-3
upper semicontinuous functionsinfinitely many playersminority gamessubgame perfect \(\epsilon \)-equilibria
Related Items (2)
Subgame-perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in perfect information games with sigma-discrete discontinuities ⋮ Discontinuous stochastic games
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