Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions

DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7zbMath1458.91118OpenAlexW2766916262MaRDI QIDQ1996108

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 3 March 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/132326/4/Simple_Contracts.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardobservable actionsfirst-best benchmarkforcing contractforcing principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items

The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter? ⋮ Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation

Cites Work

• All-or-nothing payments
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
• Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
• Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• A general solution method for moral hazard problems
• A Polynomial Optimization Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
• Unnamed Item