A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints

DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01203-wzbMath1458.91089OpenAlexW2770111508WikidataQ127756457 ScholiaQ127756457MaRDI QIDQ1996119

Nicolas Drouhin, Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin

Publication date: 3 March 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01622930v3/file/CabonDrouhin2019halv3.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

returns to scaleprice competitioncapacity constraintconvex costtacit collusionlimit pricing strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (2)

Chamberlin without differentiation: Soft capacity constrained price competition with free entry ⋮ Losses from cross-holdings in a duopoly with convex cost and strategic input price determination

Cites Work

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• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
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• A Model in which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price
• Mixed Bertrand equilibria under decreasing returns to scale: an embarrassment of riches
• Winner-take-all price competition

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