Crisis contracts

DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01204-9zbMath1458.91216OpenAlexW4243766324MaRDI QIDQ1996121

Hans Gersbach, Volker Britz, Elias Aptus

Publication date: 3 March 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01204-9

zbMATH Keywords

hedgingbanking crisescapital requirementsbankers' paycrisis contractsexcessive risk taking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Chaotic banking crises and regulations
• Liaisons dangereuses: increasing connectivity, risk sharing, and systemic risk
• Public trust and government betrayal
• Bank capital, fire sales, and the social value of deposits
• Social rationality, separability, and equity under uncertainty
• Fair management of social risk
• RESILIENCE TO CONTAGION IN FINANCIAL NETWORKS
• Executive Compensation and Risk Taking*
• Bank Regulation, CEO Compensation, and Boards
• On Watts' cascade model with random link weights

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