Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?

DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01208-5zbMath1458.91125OpenAlexW2954145647WikidataQ127611088 ScholiaQ127611088MaRDI QIDQ1996127

Alessandro Fedele, Luca Panaccione

Publication date: 3 March 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01208-5

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcompensation packagesindependent preferencesreshuffling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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• Information-constrained optima with retrading: an externality and its market-based solution
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• Competitive equilibrium with moral hazard in economies with multiple commodities.
• Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
• Inside Debt*
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets
• Moral hazard and general equilibrium in large economies

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