Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power

DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01210-xzbMath1458.91178OpenAlexW3123196256MaRDI QIDQ1996131

Gert Pönitzsch, Andreas Grunewald, Emanuel Hansen

Publication date: 3 March 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01210-x

zbMATH Keywords

electionsasymmetric informationselectionconstitutional design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (1)

Information manipulation and competition

Cites Work

• Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
• Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling
• Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
• Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Towards a Theory of Elections with Probabilistic Preferences
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

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