School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.10.007zbMath1458.91145OpenAlexW3098375022MaRDI QIDQ1996170

Ziyang Shen, Zhen-Hua Jiao

Publication date: 3 March 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

school choiceresponsivenessefficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanismpriority-based affirmative action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice
• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
• A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
• College admissions with affirmative action
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
• School choice under partial fairness
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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