Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.10.008zbMath1458.91142OpenAlexW3099592319MaRDI QIDQ1996172

Siwei Chen, Eun Jeong Heo

Publication date: 3 March 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicitypriority profileschool choice problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms

Cites Work

• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• Constrained school choice
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Robust stability in matching markets
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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