Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations

DOI10.1016/j.matcom.2019.04.003OpenAlexW2942137019WikidataQ128028331 ScholiaQ128028331MaRDI QIDQ1997670

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 2 March 2021

Published in: Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.matcom.2019.04.003

zbMATH Keywords

simulationcompetitiondifferential equationsinterventioncaptive participantsgovernmentsideologuesmercenariessponsorsterrorist organizations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx)

Related Items (1)

Governments Playing Games and Combating the Dynamics of a Terrorist Organization

Cites Work

• Multithreat multisite protection: a security case study
• Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
• Defending against multiple different attackers
• Location of terror response facilities: a game between state and terrorist
• The development and interaction of terrorist and fanatic groups
• A dynamical model of terrorism
• Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks
• Terror and counterterror operations: Differential game with cyclical Nash solution
• Stochastic conditional and unconditional warfare
• Lanchester model for three-way combat
• Optimizing counter-terror operations: should one fight fire with ``fire or ``water?
• Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow
• A bistable belief dynamics model for radicalization within sectarian conflict
• Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game

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