The complexity of \((\mathsf{E}+\mathsf{Var})\)-equilibria, \(\mathsf{ESR}\)-equilibria, and \(\mathsf{SuperE}\)-equilibria for 2-players games with few cost values
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Publication:1998841
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2021.01.031zbMath1500.91043OpenAlexW3124071060MaRDI QIDQ1998841
Chryssis Georgiou, Marios Mavronicolas, Burkhard Monien
Publication date: 9 March 2021
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2021.01.031
complexity of equilibriaexpectation plus variancevaluation functions2-player minimization gamesexpectation with the property that variance is zeroextended Sharpe ratio
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