Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions
DOI10.1016/j.ins.2019.09.019zbMath1460.91019OpenAlexW2972680543WikidataQ127253060 ScholiaQ127253060MaRDI QIDQ1999211
Deng-Feng Li, Jiuh-Biing Sheu, Benjamin Lev, Wen-Jian Zhao, Yong-Wu Dai, Jia-Cai Liu
Publication date: 18 March 2021
Published in: Information Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2019.09.019
least square methodequal surplus division valueprofit distributionexcess vectorequal contribution division valuelogistics enterprise
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)
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