The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2019.03.004zbMath1415.92210OpenAlexW2933693093WikidataQ92849808 ScholiaQ92849808MaRDI QIDQ1999485

Justin R. Brown, L. S. Premo

Publication date: 27 June 2019

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2019.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

population densitycooperationevolutionary game theoryerrorconditional movement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Ecology (92D40) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Uses Software

• NetLogo

Cites Work

• The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
• Movement patterns, social dynamics, and the evolution of cooperation
• Random mobility and spatial structure often enhance cooperation
• Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
• Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: two-player matrix games
• Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
• Does mobility decrease cooperation?
• A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Lévy flights and cooperation among mobile individuals
• Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
• Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
• THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION
• Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

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